Unable to complete is a euphemism for refusal of Ethics Officers to apply the rules.
Receivability

I. Time Limit

1. The determination under review was issued by the Director of the United Nations Ethics Office ("UNEO"), by memorandum referenced PaR Case ID 20331 and dated 25 October 2019. The Complainant’s request for review was first sent to the then AC/EPUN on 28 October 2019\(^ {17} \). The request was therefore made within the thirty-day time limit provided by the SGB, and is thus receivable.

II. Conflict of interest of the Alternate Chair

2. The Complainant requested an independent review of the UN Ethics Office’s determination to be referred to external review for conflict considerations. In this context the Complainant submitted the following:

   - In her message addressed to me dated 12 March\(^ {18} \), the Complainant stated: You may be aware that I have a complaint of abuse of authority against the entire Ethics Panel of the United Nations, of which you are now Alternate Chair, in part relating to its role in Ms Green’s actions outlined above, as well as its role in the mishandling of my previous case, which is also the subject of two ongoing cases before the UNDT (of course, the Administration removed the judge at 24 hours' notice when it became evident he planned to criticise the Ethics Office and possibly re-open Wasserstrom). It is clear and unambiguous that you, like all of your colleagues on EPUN, have a conflict of interest in conducting this review. I would expect all EPUN members to be interviewed about decisions taken in my cases - you cannot act as witness in one case and adjudicate another concerning the same individual. The only remaining option in line with the policy is to refer my case externally per para. 9.3 of ST/SGB/2017/2. I note that former staff members, including former Ethics Officers, cannot be considered external.

   - In her message to me dated 5 May 2020\(^ {19} \), the Complainant restated that all members of EPUN [have] a conflict of interest.

By message of 11 May 2020\(^ {20} \), I informed the Complainant that following review of her submission, I do not consider myself conflicted. I added in that context that I have not dealt with any case related to her in the past and I have no knowledge of and have not been involved in anything related to the complaint against the EPUN.

   - In her response to me dated 11 May 2020\(^ {21} \), the Complainant expressed her strong disagreement with my assessment. The Complainant added in that context: according to previous reviewers, my case was discussed at EPUN, of which you are a member, while you were a member of it. As usual, there is not even an independent forum in which I may make my argument. Kindly let me know precisely what information on my case you currently have. I explicitly

\(^{17}\) Annex 4  
\(^{18}\) Annex 5  
\(^{19}\) Annex 6  
\(^{20}\) Annex 13  
\(^{21}\) Annex 7
request that you interview the Secretary-General as part of this review. He admitted during our meeting, witnessed by Miranda Brown (also happy to be interviewed) that Kate Gilmore had retaliated against me for both this and my previous reports.

- In a follow-up message to me dated 12 May 2020\textsuperscript{22}, the Complainant stated as \textit{I directly informed you of my complaint against every member of EPUN, including you, please expand on your reasoning as to why you do not have a conflict of interest in considering a complaint by someone who, prior to you receiving that complaint, had accused you of abuse of authority. It seems a textbook case that the subject of a complaint of abuse of authority cannot be reasonably perceived to be unbiased in adjudicating whether the complainant deserves protection while the initial complaint is unresolved. [...] You cannot claim to be unaware of a complaint of which I directly informed you. Can you clarify if you are claiming that you were not present at the meetings of EPUN where my case was discussed, or if you are claiming that your colleagues on EPUN lied about the matter being discussed.}

- The complainant takes the view that I am conflicted out based on the claim that (1) she introduced a complaint of abuse of authority against all EPUN members, including myself, and (2) that I must be aware of that complaint. The Complainant does not substantiate her submission by evidence that she introduced an abuse of authority complaint against all EPUN members. The Complainant also does not provide any evidence to substantiate that I should be conflicted out. As per my message to the Complainant, I have not dealt with any case related to her in the past and I have no knowledge of and have not been involved in anything related to a general complaint against EPUN.

- Two previous members of EPUN were, as ACs, reviewing the Complainant’s case in 2017/2018, so they will not be involved at all in this review. In addition, two other previous ACs who have been involved in the instant case (from October 2019 to March 2020), but did not complete this current independent review, will also not be further involved in any way. I reiterate that I was not involved until the instant case was referred to me as current AC, and neither were the current other EPUN members whom I might choose to consult, if I consider that such consultation might be helpful.

3. As a result, I conclude that I am not conflicted in any way, and I can properly receive the Complainant’s request, and conduct this independent review in my role as AC/EPUN.

**Main Case Review**

I. Summary of Background Information

4. Based on the letter requesting review and relevant case files transferred to me, a summary of background information can be made as follows:

- From the available information, I understand that the Complainant joined the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) as Human Rights Officer at the Human Rights Council, at the P-3 level, on 6 January 2012.

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\textsuperscript{22} Annex 8
In February 2013, the Complainant first reported what she considered serious misconduct by her Chief of section in sharing certain information with a member state, China. Subsequent events produced reports of harassment, acceptance of financial benefits from a member delegation, and improper selection processes. The situation became politically highly charged, as concerns about the Uighur minority in China became more discussed, and some NGOs even conducted a demonstration at an OHCHR meeting. The death in custody of one activist became part of the narrative, although it was never proven that the alleged improper disclosures were connected in any way to that death. The senior management of OHCHR stated that it had done nothing wrong. Later, they changed the practice in an implicit acceptance that the Complainant had been right all along.

On 7 October 2016, the Complainant’s request for protection against retaliation (PaR 20331) was rejected by UNEO. This determination was not, at that date, reviewable, as the SGB of 2017 had not then been issued, but, during the course of the consideration of this case, the first edition of the SGB came into force (on 20 January 2017). The 2017 SGB brought in two new processes: (i) a refusal by UNEO when its director is of the view that there is an actual or potential conflict of interest, and (ii) an independent review mechanism, through review by the AC.

From April 2018 through September 2019, the Complainant’s assignment arrangements were under the control of ASG/OHRM. Under OHRM authority, from 1 May 2018 to 30 September 2019, the Complainant was temporarily assigned to a P-4 level position with the Rule of Law and Democracy Section. It is not clear why, but apparently, in September 2019, the placement authority for the Complainant was transferred to OHCHR.

On 20 September 2019, the Complainant was offered two P3 positions that she did not accept.

On 7 October 2019, the Complainant was transferred to one of the positions offered in September, a P-3 position in the Human Rights and Economic and Social Issues Section (HRESIS) of the Thematic Engagement Special Procedures and Rights to Development Division.

Meanwhile, on 14 August 2019, a former staff member of OHCHR wrote to the HC stating that the DHC had misrepresented her educational qualifications. In that report the former staff member named the Complainant as the researcher of the information, and thus co-filer of the complaint. On 10 September, the Complainant reported the same allegation to the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). On 3 October 2019, the Complainant filed with UNEO a request for protection against retaliation.

In her PaR form, and in an email to UNEO on 7 October 2019, the Complainant claimed that, as retaliation for her complaints, (a) she had been deprived of functions and (b) she had been transferred from a Regular Budget ("RB") funded post to an extra-budgetary ("GTA/XB") funded post.

Based on its preliminary review, UNEO found that the Complainant participated in a protected activity when she copied the Chef de Cabinet on her complaints of fraud to the HC on 14 August 2019, reported alleged fraud to OIOS on 10

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23 Annex 1A
24 Annex 1B
25 Annex 1 and Annex 2
September 2019 as well as when she followed up with the High Commissioner on 14 September 2019 on her 14 August complaint and copied the Chef de Cabinet and the Secretary General.

- By memorandum of its Director, on 25 October 2019, the UN Ethics Office determined that the evidence the Complainant had submitted did not establish a prima facie case that these protected activities were a contributing factor in causing any retaliation.26

II. Scope of Review

5. Section 9.2 of ST/SGB/2017/2/Rev.1 stipulates the competence and obligation of the Alternate Chair of the Ethics Panel of the United Nations, which provides that:

“The Alternate Chair of the Ethics Panel will seek comments from the complainant and the Administration on the request for review and undertake his or her own independent review of the matter, which shall include review of the action previously taken by the Ethics Office and a determination of any additional action required, including whether referral for investigation is warranted under section 8.1 above”.

III. Complainant’s Reasons for seeking Review

6. In her request for review dated 28 October 201927, the Complainant raised the following issue

A. UNEO’s alleged conflict of interest

a) The UN Ethics Office had a very obvious conflict of interests, given that the Complainant had at the time of the Protection against Retaliation assessment been challenging failures of the Ethics Office before the UNDT. The UN Ethics Office should have as per the Complainant’s request declared a conflict of interest and should have refer[red] the case externally. Instead, the UN Ethics Office proceeded to examine [the Complainant’s] new complaint.

b) The UN Ethics Office finding in the Complainant’s first application for protection was that it was "unreasonable" of the Complainant, as a Human Rights Officer, to report the handing over of names of human rights defenders to China (and only to China), which directly resulted in arbitrary arrest, detention and torture of their family members. The Complainant further states in this context that the Ethics Office misled subsequent reviewers, and has for 606 days failed to take measures directly recommended by the subsequent reviewers due to an alleged conflict of interest that narrowly applies only to recommendations for my protection.

c) For these reasons, and in view of the Complainant’s submission of a conflict of interest situation, the Complainant requested the then AC/EPUN, not be in touch

26 See Annex 3
27 Annex 4
with the Ethics Office on this matter. The Complainant further requested the appeal to be referred externally.

B. The complaint against the DHC
d) The Complainant further states that she:

a. reported in August that the Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights apparently does not hold any academic degree from the University of Melbourne, and related misrepresentation of other qualifications.

b. Immediately following this report, promises that [she] would be fully consulted on my transfer, with an opportunity to examine the full list of vacant posts, per the instructions of the Secretary-General, were rescinded, and the Deputy High Commissioner ordered [her] forcible transfer to a post which does not appear on any workplan and bears no relationship to [her] expertise and experience.

c. [She] remain[s] without terms of reference.

d. The Ethics Office claimed to see no link between these events, which immediately followed each other.

e. The Ethics Office also appeared to (still) believe that a finding of retaliation requires that the retaliation itself amount to unlawful conduct absent retaliatory motive.

e) In her message of 5 May 2020\textsuperscript{28}, the Complainant states that:

a. She remains exposed to severe retaliation.

b. The Secretary-General himself even admitted that I was so exposed, and claimed I had been protected, at a public meeting in December, of which an audio recording is available. In a private meeting in February, he explicitly named Kate Gilmore as one of three named individuals who had retaliated against me.

c. I have never, at any point, been protected in any way. I reported complicity of the UN Human Rights Office in the international crimes of torture and genocide. I have been suffering retaliation since 2013.

IV. Analysis and Findings of the Independent Review

A: Conflict of interest

7. The Complainant stated in her request for protection against retaliation dated 3 October 2019 that there is a clear conflict of interest and therefore requested that the complaint will be immediately externally.

8. As per message of 5 October 2019\textsuperscript{29}, the UN Ethics Office communicated to the Complainant the following:

\textsuperscript{28} Annex 6
\textsuperscript{29} Annex 20
We note your statement below alleging that there is a “clear and evident conflict of interests in sending this to an Ethics Officer” and that your request for protection against retaliation “should immediately be sent externally.”

[...] Pursuant to Section 7.7 of ST/SGB/2017/2/Rev.1, it is the Director of the Ethics Office who decides whether there is an actual or potential conflict of interest in her reviewing a request for protection against retaliation.

Moreover, you do not identify the clear and evident conflict of interest to which you refer. The Director, following a review of the materials provided, has determined that there is no actual or potential conflict of interest in her reviewing your request for protection against retaliation.

Please advise whether you would like the Ethics Office to commence a preliminary review in accordance with the applicable policy or whether you would like to withdraw your request.

9. In her response of 5 October 2019[30], the Complainant stated the following:

Ms Armstrong previously forced a complaint I made out of the Ethics Office, despite no provision for such in the policy, because I had complained of the leak of my case, apparently from the Ethics Office. She stated that this created a conflict of interest. This circumstance has not changed. Does Ms Armstrong now admit that the Ethics Office in fact has no conflict arising from this allegation, and thus that the UN position taken before the UNDT in case UNDT/GVA/2018/099 is knowingly false?

I believe that an actual conflict of interest arises from the fact that Ms Elia Armstrong has repeatedly misled subsequent Ethics Officers about the reasons for reopening my initial case, and is currently a named party having seriously mishandled my case in UNDT/GVA/2018/099, which remains open. At one point, the UN proposed calling Ms Armstrong as a witness against me. There is thus a clear and obvious conflict of interest in her now taking any decision regarding my protection.

If Ms Armstrong persists in refusing to see this clear conflict, I have no option but the continuation of the review by the Ethics Office, and a subsequent challenge when such challenge inevitably fails due to the clear bias. I think it is important to document that the UN in fact has no whistleblower protection.

I appeal once again to the Secretary-General to ensure external referral of this complaint, and copy Government Accountability Project.

10. Taking the instant case in isolation, as UNEO did, the decision that there was no conflict of interest can be understood. But I do not believe that this was the correct approach. It is clear to me that the 2019 protected activity was just the latest in a series of protected activities beginning in 2013. In the Complainant’s earlier request for protection in 2016, the Director/UNEO decided that she should recuse herself from the determination, and transferred the case to the then AC/EPUN for preliminary review (see paragraph 10 of AC/EPUN’s “Outcome of the Independent Review”, 27 February 2018)[31]. If it was right to recuse at that stage, it would have been right to recuse again. Although the SGB makes it clear in Section 7.7, that it is the Director, UNEO, who decides whether there is an actual or potential conflict of interest in her reviewing a request for protection against retaliation, that decision must be subject to independent review if such a review is requested, as it is here by

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[31] Annex 17
this Complainant. It follows that it is my view that Director/UNEO should have recused herself from making a determination in the instant case.

B: The protected activities

11. This case is, on the face of it, about the reports that the Complainant made alleging that the DHC had misrepresented her academic qualifications. This allegation, of course, if true, would be a serious case. The first report was made to the HC, copying the Chef de Cabinet, in an email on 14 August 2019, together with a reminder on 14 September 2019. This email referenced the Complainant, but was not sent by her. UNEO, perhaps somewhat generously, accepted this report as a protected activity of the Complainant. The second report was made by the Complainant to the Office for Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) on 11 September 2019 following a meeting the previous day, reiterating the claims made against the DHC. UNEO determined that this was a protected activity; I agree, a protected activity following the several other protected activities.

12. Because UNEO took the complaint about the DHC’s alleged misconduct in isolation, it did not consider the continuing effects of the 2013 events and subsequent allegations. But the potential seriousness of the allegation against the DHC pales into insignificance when viewed beside the Complainant’s original objections in 2013 on OHCHR’s practice of providing what many would consider highly confidential information about human right activists to one particular member state. I do not understand why UNEO determined (in 2016) that this was not a whistleblower action that should be protected, nor why the then AC/EPUN did not accept it as a protected activity. Perhaps the reviewers placed too much weight on senior management’s point of view; many in the UN find it difficult to accept that a practice is wrong when it appears to have been sanctioned from the top.

13. But Regulation 1.2 (i) of the UN SRRs makes it clear in that staff members “shall not communicate to any Government, entity, person or any other source any information known or ought to have been known has not been made public ...” and Rule 1.2(c) states that “Staff members have a duty to report any breach of the Organisation’s regulations and rules to officials whose responsibility it is to take appropriate action ...”. The Complainant acted according to these principles but, as a P3 complaining about a senior management practice, she suffered the inevitable push-back. The independent review of this case by the then AC/EPUN in 2018 is clear that, whether the Complainant got it right or wrong, she was at all times acting in good faith.

14. The concern that the Complainant caused to senior management can be seen in the subsequent strongly worded press release by the High Commissioner (HC) in February 2017 (“.... in fact the staff member has had her contracts renewed and remains employed by the organization on full pay ....”)33, following the leak and publication of a redacted copy of UNEO’s memorandum of 7 October 2016. The HC recognized the Complainant as worthy of protection. The management was naturally and perhaps primarily interested in good relations with the member state; the Complainant was interested in human rights and protection of human rights activists. OHCHR was, by virtue of the Complainant’s whistleblowing, placed in a very awkward diplomatic position by a human rights issue that it struggled to handle well. A whistleblower’s reporting of such a practice, which was contrary to

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32 Annex 17
33 Annex 18
34 Annex 22
Again, this is based on the change in OHCHR’s public position after its 2017 press release admitting the policy. There is no evidence the policy stopped.

fundamental UN principles and values, is exactly the sort of activity that must be protected; it is far more important than minor infractions of bureaucratic rules, which the system finds it much more easy to classify as protected. I believe that the Complainant was also proved right, as, after an initial attempt to justify the practice, OHCHR changed its position on this and discontinued the practice (see paragraph 12 of AC/EPUN’s independent review of 27 February 2018)35.

C: Detriment

15. The Complainant was indeed transferred out of her original section, and then started a six-year tour of various temporary postings. She was still on this sojourn in 2019 when she and another (former) staff member discovered what they believed to be misrepresentation by the then DHC, and reported it. Shortly after, in September 2019, aout ten days before her then posting was due to expire, the Complainant was given a choice of two posts for further transfer. But she was not happy with either, so she rejected them both.36 She was then (on 7 October 2019) transferred to one of those two posts. Later, although I cannot see from the documents exactly how this happened, she was placed on SLWP, and now apparently is sitting at home with no function.

16. UNEO seems to take the view that the Complainant’s own delays are critical here; “The length of the proceeding back and forth between you and OHCHR, and not a wilful act on the part of OHCHR, appears to be the cause of the “deprivation of functions” that you apparently experienced from 1 to 4 October, during which time you appear to have been without assignments, albeit with a reporting officer”.37 Apart from showing a surprising lack of empathy for a whistleblower who had been in limbo for six years, but was expected to do in six days what OHCHR could not do in those six years, it is concerning that the deprivation of functions accepted by UNEO has been limited to four days in October 2019. The deprivation of function had begun in 2013, and was escalating badly by October 2019, and continues to escalate until now, when the Complainant appears to have no functions at all now.38 I am also unclear about what UNEO was expecting as a “wilful act on the part of OHCHR”. The transfer was wilful in the sense it was a deliberate decision, and the foreseeable consequence was a deprivation of functions.

17. Transfer to another post in this situation could only be temporary when the Complainant was still under protection. The Complainant appealed to UNDT to suspend the transfer action, but, not surprisingly, the court rejected that application at the interlocutory hearing on 16 October 201939, since no irreparable damage would be done, and a full hearing could properly review all the facts in due course. The learned judge was assured that the position to which the Complainant was to be transferred was “stable and reliable” in terms of funding, but did not examine the other aspects of the position, i.e., the allegation that the post had no real function. Such examination was not necessary on an interlocutory hearing (which UNAT later confirmed it to be), and, in any event, since the hearing, the Complainant has apparently been placed on SLWP with no function at all.

18. It must be stressed that being on full pay is not sufficient protection in itself, except for short periods when necessary as a temporary measure. This transfer occurred

35 Annex 17
36 Annex 1C
37 Annex 3, Para. 24 (b)
38 Annex 1D
39 Annex 19
within a month of the Complainant’s protected activity, and at a time when the Administration was forced to do something as her previous temporary assignment expired at the end of September 2019. The DHC was in charge of administration (including, apparently for some time in September 2019, placement) and it is difficult to see how she could not have been involved in this process in the normal course of business. UN EO seems to require the Complainant to prove direct involvement of the DHC. I am not sure how a complainant can prove that, or whether it is a relevant consideration. The retaliation is alleged against the Organisation; the DHC is merely one possible agent of that retaliation.

19. But the placement/transfer process was fair to begin with - we shall assume deliberately so - in that the Complainant was offered two posts, one on regular budget, and one not. The Complainant considers that she has a lien over her previous post, but had apparently been banned from that department as a result of her earlier whistleblowing, and indeed it would appear that she was generally HR-listed in some adverse manner, as she apparently received no invitations for job interview, despite being on the P3 and P4 job rosters and applying (she says) for seventy or so posts. However, when it came for the management to choose which post, the post with extra-budgetary funding was chosen. Although the management no doubt thought, with some justification, that the Complainant was being deliberately obstructive, in my view they should in view of the particularity of this case have taken the high ground and transferred her to the post that was on the regular budget, not the post with extra-budgetary funding and, the complainant alleges, with no function or place in the organisation, and no long-term funding security. Why the non-regular budget post was chosen, of course we do not know at this stage of this process. Sadly those involved in whistleblower and other problematic cases have seen this before; management placing a staff member on a post with no real purpose and thus no secured funding, accepting that the incumbent might get frustrated and leave (what I believe in Japan is graphically referred to as transfer to “the window seat”, i.e., take your money and just look out of the window; if you do not like it, you can resign). If that was the approach here, the next stage we would expect would be special leave on full pay (SLWP), which has now happened, and then, after the finalisation of all other matters, abolition of post, and termination of the staff member. In these situations, this would be done to sideline and isolate the staff member (how “punishment” works in bureaucracy). I hope that is not the case here, but the sequence of events seems to point in that direction. I am sure that the Administration would have a different version of this, but, on prima facie review, this is what I see.

20. It follows that I do not believe that the first whistleblowing, its aftermath and the last whistleblowing can be separated. They are very much part of the same narrative. In many of these cases, as here I think, whistleblowers become aggressive and uncompromising, thereby losing the support of even those colleagues who are trying to help them. We have to expect such behaviour from individuals under great stress, much as we would prefer it not to happen. Protection should not be denied just because the whistleblower has been unpleasant or difficult.

D. Causation

21. My view therefore is that the principal disclosure of 2013 was a protected activity then, and remains so today. This has led to a process (not yet completed, but clearly likely) whereby the complainant risks to be declared redundant by abolition of post (perhaps on financial grounds justified by funding shortages following the Covid-19 pandemic). Such a termination would be the culmination of six or so years of
This is precisely why the Secretary-General refuses to act. The UN wants the only staff member to have reported a dangerous policy to resign and therefore stop being able to get evidence. The problem is not complicity in genocide, but that I spoke up.

22. Since no complainant can ever prove what is in the mind of an alleged retaliator (the organisation acting through one or more of its officials), in whistleblower cases we must look at the sequence of events to imply the motive. Looking at the words of the SGB, I find it impossible to determine that there was no “direct or indirect detrimental action that adversely affects the employment or working conditions of an individual”, and, looking at the circumstances described above, it must be that “such action has been recommended, threatened or taken for the purpose of punishing, intimidating or injuring an individual because that individual engaged in activity protected by the present policy”, or was, at a minimum, a contributory factor. The Complainant appears to have no meaningful work - actually no work at all - and clings on to staff status because the previous HC had considered it necessary to accept that she was protected (in his press release).

23. Simply paying someone is not sufficient. Placing a staff member in a position which deprives her of all meaningful function is detrimental action under the SGB, and, subject to full investigation, appears to be, prima facie, taken to punish or intimidate.

**Determination on Independent Review under section 9.2 of the SGB**

24. I hereby therefore determine on review that the determination of UNEO of 25 October 2019 (PaR case 20331) be reversed, and replaced by a prima facie finding of retaliation.

**Recommendations under section 9.2 of the SGB**

25. On prima facie, my determination is that the Complainant “blew the whistle” on what she considered to be a serious unethical practice adopted by OHCHR, and has suffered the consequences for that for the last seven years. The practice of disclosure of sensitive and confidential information to one member state alone was discontinued some years later, following it would appear, the intervention of another member state. Further whistle-blowing by the Complainant on other matters exacerbated her tenuous status within the organization.

26. If OHCHR complies with the prima facie determination (a) the Complainant should be transferred to a regular budget P3 post commensurate with her qualifications and experience within sixty calendar days, (b) any entry on the Complainant's HR file which restrict or impede her application for, or consideration for, another post in the
future should be removed, and (c) in order to try to make up ground for the loss of seven years, she should be placed on the roster for genuine consideration in all upcoming P4 posts for which she chooses to apply. If OHCHR implements this *prima facie* determination, and accepts (a), (b) and (c), within sixty calendar days following the issuance of the Independent Review then a referral for investigation is not warranted, and I do not recommend it.

27. If OHCHR does not accept the *prima facie* determination in paragraph 25, or if UNEO has not been informed by OHCHR within sixty calendar days following the issuance of the Independent Review that the organisation has accepted the determination and reinstated the Complainant in accordance with paragraph 26 above, then UNEO must refer the case to OIOS for investigation. Given the sensitive and political nature of this case, OIOS should be requested to treat the case with high priority, and not exceed 120 calendar days to complete the investigation.

28. During the process outlined in paragraphs 26 and 27 above, the Complainant should be protected from any adverse personnel action, i.e., her present posting should be continued unless at any time she agrees to be transferred to a more suitable posting.

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Helmut Buss
Director, UNHCR Ethics Office
Acting in capacity of Alternate Chair
Ethics Panel of the United Nations

27 July 2020

Attachments: Annexes 1-21